

E 1440

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. )  
- AGAINST - )  
ARAKI, SADAO, et al. )  
) AFFIDAVIT.

I, MAEDA, Tamon, make oath and say as follows:

By profession I am a newspaper editorial writer and also at one time deputy mayor of Tokyo, a member of the governing body of the International Labor Office at Geneva and Minister of Education, beginning August 18, 1945 until January 13, 1946.

During the years 1928 to 1938 I was an editorial writer on the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun. I have no recollection in 1928 of any organized program by the military or the government of Japan, through newspapers, to build or develop any propaganda in anticipation of the Manchurian Incident. Through 1926, 1927 and 1928 the general atmosphere in Japan was tense. The military and ultra-nationalistic groups attributing the weakened condition of finance and weakened condition of Japan during these years to too much liberal tendencies on the part of the government and people. As a newspaper man and as such having knowledge of governmental policy during this period of time I know the TANAKA Cabinet was formed for the purpose of adopting a more aggressive policy in connection with Manchuria. Beginning with 1930 propaganda was disseminated by the government through the newspapers to establish the thought in Japan that Manchuria was the lifeline of Japan and a stronger policy in connection with Manchuria must be adopted; that acting upon instructions from the government, editorial writers, ultra-nationalistic speakers and writers of books were all united in a concerted effort to establish public opinion for more aggressive action in Manchuria. In the beginning of this policy the government did not take any distinct method of suppressing newspapers in opposition to this policy but rather they favored the papers, scholars and public speakers who advocated the same. This was done very tactfully and gradually. Shortly preceding 1931 stricter methods were used by law enforcement agencies to suppress liberal writers, teachers and others who were in opposition to this policy, while on the other hand every encouragement was given those who were in favor of it.

Through newspapers, publishers, writers, speakers and, in fact, all channels by which propaganda could be disseminated it was claimed on the part of the government and military that Manchuria was the lifeline of Japan, that Japan must expand into Manchuria and develop economically and industrially and set it up as a defense state against Russia; that as a result of certain treaty rights, Japan was entitled to control Manchuria and, in addition to this propaganda, propaganda of a sentimental nature was disseminated based upon the fact that Japanese blood had been shed in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese war and that by reason of these sacrifices Japan was entitled to control Manchuria and to realize the fruits thereof.

Following the Manchurian Incident the government and the military started an organized program of justifying Japan's position in Manchuria, partly to offset the criticism at home. Following the Manchurian Incident the War Ministry started censoring newspapers and editorials and in addition to the censorship laws relating to this subject officers called on any writer or newspaper who might have printed something that was unsatisfactory to the War Ministry and advised such writer or newspaper that such an article was displeasing to the War Ministry. Further control of newspapers and editorial writers was exercised by the War Ministry through the use of several violent organizations who would give threats to the writer or to the editor of a newspaper publishing anything considered unfavorable to the policy of the government and the military.

About 1936 when the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed I gave a lecture at a certain meeting at which I stated at this lecture that by reason of this Anti-Comintern Pact Japan had isolated herself from the rest of the world and in which lecture I expressed disapproval of the Anti-Comintern Pact. As a result of this lecture two officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel, one from the War Ministry and another from the General Staff, called on me, stating that each had been attaches to the Japanese Embassy, one in Italy and the other in Germany; that they did not like my expressing disapproval of the Anti-Comintern Pact and instructed me that in the future when writing or speaking on such subjects to do so in a more favorable aspect. While no actual threats were made to me there was much rattling of their sabers and no possibility of misunderstanding their disapproval of my action.

I became Minister of Education following the end of the War in 1945. My first official act was to have a survey made in the school system for the purpose of removing from the schools text books which were strongly ultra-nationalistic and militaristic and gave orders that such books should be destroyed. I gave the final review to these text books and found them ultra-nationalistic and militaristic, particularly in history, civics and geography, and gave instructions to all the principals in the schools that more liberal education methods must be adopted. I ordered all of such textbooks destroyed for the reason they were used to teach the students, first, that Japan was a country superior to all other countries, that was the most objectionable; another was the confusion of facts with mystery and legend; too much admiration of military action and warfare; too much admiration and homage to military officers and the idea of absolute subjection of the individual in favor of the state.

In addition to the textbooks which I ordered destroyed for the reasons stated there was also issued by the Ministry of Education to be widely read by teachers, students and citizens at large a book entitled "Fundamental Principles of the National Polity," published in May 1937, and "The Way of National Subjects," which was published in March 1941.

Upon becoming Minister of Education in 1945 a survey of the Japanese school system as it had existed previously established that before the China Incident the military took over control of all the schools by placing in the schools Army officers who supervised the military teaching

and training, this control following the China Incident becoming so absolute that such officers instructed the principals of the schools as to how the courses and administration of the school system should be conducted.

MAEDA, Temon

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named MAEDA, Temon, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, \_\_\_\_\_, HEREBY CERTIFY That I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that I, this day, read the foregoing Affidavit to the above-named MAEDA, Temon in Japanese, and in so doing, truly and correctly translated the contents thereof from English into Japanese; and that said MAEDA, Temon stated to me that the contents of said Affidavit were the truth, and that he was willing to sign said Affidavit under oath; and that said MAEDA, Temon was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence, and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said affiant.

Dated this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.